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Abstract: Lanchester equations and their extensions are widely used to calculate attrition in
models of warfare. This paper examines how Lanchester models fit detailed daily data on the
battles of Kursk and Ardennes. The data on Kursk, often called the greatest tank battle in history,
was only recently made available. A new approach is used to find the optimal parameter values
and gain an understanding of how well various parameter combinations explain the battles. It
turns out that a variety of Lanchester models fit the data about as well. This explains why
previous studies on Ardennes, using different minimization techniques and data formulations,
have found disparate optimal fits. We also find that none of the basic Lanchester laws (i.e.,
square, linear, and logarithmic) fit the data particularly well or consistently perform better than
the others. This means that it does not matter which of these laws you use, for with the right
coefficients you will get about the same result. Furthermore, no constant attrition coefficient
Lanchester law fits very well. The failure to find a good-fitting Lanchester model suggests that
it may be beneficial to look for new ways to model highly aggregated attrition. © 2003 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 51: 95–116, 2004.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Combat models provide information that assists decision-makers in making and justifying
decisions that involve the expenditure of billions of dollars and impact many lives. For example,
the simulation Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) was used to give senior Army leadership
insight into potential courses of action in the planning of Desert Storm [1]. Attrition plays a
pivotal role in most combat models, particularly campaign-level simulations, such as CEM. The
attrition in CEM, and many other combat models, is based on extensions of the theory developed
by Lanchester [11] (see also Osipov [14] and Taylor [17]). Due to a dearth of data, particularly
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two-sided, time-phased data, the validity of Lanchester equations as a model of aggregate
attrition remains in question. This research examines how well Lanchester equations fit the only
detailed two-sided, time-phased combat data available. In particular, we look at how well
Lanchester models describe the battles of Kursk and Ardennes. Moreover, we test whether any
one of the common variants of Lanchester’s equations fits the battles better than the others.
Lanchester hypothesized that force levels in combat could be characterized by a coupled set
of differential equations. A generalized version of Lanchester equations, as described by
Bracken [2], is
B˙ t  ad or 1/dRtpBtq, (1)
R˙ t  b1/d or dBtpRtq, (2)
where
B(t) and R(t) are the Soviet (Blue) and German (Red) force levels at time t,
B˙ (t) and R˙ (t) are the rates at which the Soviet and German force levels are changing
at time t,
a and b are constant attrition-rate parameters,
d is a tactical parameter that adjusts the attrition to the defender by a factor of (d) and
the attacker by a factor of (1/d),
p is the exponent parameter of the attacking force,
q is the exponent parameter of the defending force.
This generalized Lanchester model has five parameters (a, b, d, p, and q). The model begins
at the start of the battle (t  0) with initial force sizes B(0) and R(0). When solved numerically,
the force levels are incrementally decreased according to the equations B(t  t)  B(t) 
t B˙ (t) and R(t  t)  R(t)  t R˙ (t), until the battle ends. For us, the time step t is set
equal to one day (the data resolution) throughout the analysis.
Lanchester studied two versions of these equations. The condition p  q  1 (or, more
generally, when p  q  0) yields Lanchester’s linear law. Here, the state equation relating
force levels at time t is b(B(0)  B(t))  a(R(0)  R(t)). Lanchester viewed this as a
description of combat under “ancient conditions.” That is, these are the equations that would
result from a series of one-on-one duels between homogeneous forces. The linear law is also
considered a good model for indirect fire (sometimes called area-fire) weapons, such as artillery
(see [17]). Lanchester contrasted this with combat under “modern conditions,” which is defined
as p  1, q  0 (or, more generally, p  q  1). The state equation for modern combat is
b(B(0)2  B(t)2)  a(R(0)2  R(t)2). This formulation is known as Lanchester’s square law.
Lanchester showed the added importance of force size (relative to force quality) if attrition
follows the square law. Specifically, Lanchester used his simple models to show “the principle
of concentration” in modern combat. A third version, with p  0, q  1 (or, more generally,
q  p  1), is called the logarithmic law (see Peterson [15]). This formulation suggests that
a force’s attrition is a function of its force size, rather than the opponent’s. The logarithmic law
is sometimes used to model losses due to equipment failure, desertion, disease, and other
nonbattle losses.
There are important consequences for force structure, training, and battlefield tactics if one of
the Lanchester laws turns out to be a good model of aggregate attrition. Specifically, in the linear
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law, ability (as measured by the attrition parameters a and b) is as important as numbers. Some
have speculated that the linear law may turn out to be the “new modern conditions.” In
particular, if a force can orchestrate the battle (perhaps by using information superiority and
agile maneuvers), such that engagements are typically one-on-one, the force may be able to trade
quantity for quality.
There are few detailed two-sided, time-phased databases of historical battles. Time-phased
data are needed to estimate the five parameters for a battle because before- and after-battle data
(i.e., two time periods) result in an overdetermined system of equations, with an infinite number
of solutions. Therefore, for any p and q, we can find a and b that fit perfectly. Thus, as Hartley
and Hembold [9] write: “Unless we are able to procure [two-sided, time-phased data] we will
not be able to validate the homogeneous square law (or any other attrition law).” Fortunately,
thanks to the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) and the Dupuy Institute, detailed time-phased
data on the World War II battles of Kursk and Ardennes have recently become available (see
[3] and [5]).
The goal of this research is to enhance our understanding of highly aggregated attrition by
studying how homogeneous generalized Lanchester models fit the time-phased data on the
battles of Kursk and Ardennes. In particular, we want to see if any of the basic laws (square,
linear, or logarithmic) stand out. A better understanding of aggregate attrition offers the promise
of enhancing the utility of our campaign-level simulations. We emphasize the battle of Kursk,
as there have been several previous analyses of the Ardennes campaign. Section 2 reviews some
of the very few Lanchester attrition studies using time-phased data. A brief overview of the
battle of Kursk is provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the data on the battle
of Kursk, and introduces a new method for looking at two-sided, time-phased combat data. In
Section 5, this method is applied to the battle of Kursk data. Section 6 applies the method to the
data on the Ardennes campaign and explains why previous researchers came to different
conclusions. Section 7 examines some excursions; in particular, the effects of breaking the battle
of Kursk into multiple phases, assessing differences, and fitting only the manpower data. The
final section summarizes the key findings.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON TIME-PHASED COMBAT DATA
This section reviews the previous studies on time-phased combat data that motivated this
research. Empirical quantitative validation studies of Lanchester equations involving time-
phased data include: Bracken [2], Fricker [8], and Wiper, Pettit, and Young [20], on the
Ardennes campaign; Clemens [4] on the battle of Kursk; Hartley and Helmbold [9] on the
Inchon–Seoul campaign; and Engle on the battle of Iwo Jima [7]. The last two had reliable
time-phased data for only one side. The previous works on the Ardennes data are discussed in
some detail because different authors, using the same data, found diverse parameter estimates.
Bracken [2] formulated four different models for the Ardennes campaign using Eqs. (1) and
(2). By means of a constrained grid search, he estimated the parameters (a, b, d, p, q) for the
first 10 days of the Ardennes campaign with and without the defensive parameter (d) for combat
forces and for total forces. Among his conclusions, Bracken found that “the Lanchester linear
equation fits the [Ardennes] campaign” and there is an “attacker advantage.”
Fricker [8] extended Bracken’s analysis of the Ardennes campaign by: (1) using linear
regression to fit the data from the entire campaign (32 days) to logarithmically transformed
versions of Bracken’s generalized Lanchester equations; (2) using air-sortie data; and (3)
restructuring the data “to estimate initial force sizes that reflect all of the troops that eventually
fought in the campaign and then subtract the casualty attrition from this total on a daily basis.”
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Fricker found that neither the linear nor the square law fit well. He concludes that a force’s
losses were more a function of its own forces than of its opponent’s forces, similar to the
logarithmic law. Fricker’s best fits occur with exponent parameter values of q that are quite
large—unbelievably large, in fact. For example, one of his models yields a q of 4.6 and a p of
0. This suggests that a force could reduce its casualty rate by a factor of 24 by sending half of
its troops home, without affecting the opponent’s casualty rate. Of course, this extrapolates way
beyond the range of the data. Note: Fricker also fit Bracken’s data by regression techniques,
obtaining estimates of p and q, for the combat forces with the tactical parameter, of .43 and
.50, respectively.
Wiper, Pettit, and Young [20] used Bayesian methods to reexamine Bracken’s and Fricker’s
Ardennes data. Their model is more general in that it uses two defensive parameters, a separate
one for each side. Using Gibbs sampling, they estimate several posterior quantities of interest,
in particular the means of p and q. Normal distributions are used to quantify their prior on the
parameters (note: they have an extra defensive parameter and additional parameters for the
variances) and the residual error. The prior on p and q is an informative one, specifically, ( p,
q) is distributed as circular normal with mean (.5, .5) and variance 2  .25. This prior, which
has over a .9 probability of ( p, q) both being between 0 and 1, is consistent with the
conventional wisdom of plausible values. Moreover, the prior places equal a priori probability
on the logarithmic, linear, and square laws. The most probable prior values of p and q are the
prior mean of (.5, .5). This prior also heavily discounts p and q values larger than 1.5, with an
a priori probability of about 1 in 2000 of both p and q being greater than 1.5. Using the 10 days
of combat forces data that Bracken used, Wiper et al.’s estimated posterior mean on ( p, q) is
(.51, .48)—almost equal to the prior mean. Using 32 days of Bracken’s combat forces data, their
estimated posterior mean on ( p, q) is (.27, .84). Furthermore, using Bayes factors, they
conclude that “the logarithmic law fits best [and] the linear laws cannot be rejected, but the
square law does seem implausible.” Using Fricker’s data, and the same prior, the estimated
posterior mean on ( p, q) is (.69, 1.06). When the variance of the prior on ( p, q) is inflated by
a factor of 200 (i.e., a much less informative prior, with 2  50), the posterior mean on ( p, q)
shifts to (0.08, 4.88)—close to what Fricker found. This shows that the conclusions depend
critically on the sharpness of the prior, as the mean of the original prior and the mode of the
likelihood are about 10 prior standard deviations (  .5) apart.
Clemens [4] fit Eqs. (1) and (2), without the tactical parameter d, to the battle of Kursk. He
formatted the data as Bracken did and used two different estimation techniques: (1) linear
regression on logarithmically transformed equations, and (2) a nonlinear fit to the original
equations, using a numerical Newton-Raphson algorithm. Clemens also found that none of the
Lanchester square, linear, or logarithmic laws fit very well. Furthermore, the different estimation
techniques gave dramatically divergent estimates of the parameters. Using Newton-Raphson, his
estimates were p  0 and q  1.62, while the linear regression gave estimates of p  5.32
and q  3.63.
It is interesting to look across the breadth of Bracken’s [2], Fricker’s [8], Wiper et al.’s [20],
and Clemens’ [4] findings. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the best-fitting p and q values that
these authors found. The point here is to address the whole of the findings rather than the
specifics of the individual models. The only clear pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that the
estimates of p and q appear extremely sensitive to the different formulations and assumptions.
Note: While Bracken’s fits are all close to the linear law, this is primarily due to his constrained
grid search, which focused on parameters close to the linear law.
A couple of additional time-phased studies deserve mention. Hartley and Helmbold [9] tested
Lanchester’s square law using daily manpower numbers from the Inchon-Seoul campaign. They
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concluded that: (1) “any square law effects are largely masked by other factors”; (2) the data
better fit a set of three separate battles (one distinct battle every six or seven days); and (3)
“unless we are able to procure data . . . with many periodic casualty figures for both sides, we
will not be able to validate the homogeneous square law (or any other attrition law).” The first
attempt to use time-phased data to validate Lanchester’s square law was Engel [17]. Using daily
data on the American forces during the battle of Iwo Jima, as well as the starting and ending
figures for the Japanese, he was able to graphically demonstrate that the square law could
reasonably track U.S. force levels. Finally, Speight [16] contains a nice summary discussion and
additional analysis on the Ardennes, Inchon–Seoul, and Iwo Jima data. Moreover, he has an
excellent discussion on the challenges, limitations, and hazards associated with trying to explain
something as complex as combat, or even combat attrition, with simple functions, such as
Lanchester equations. Inevitably, for highly aggregated data, many important factors (e.g.,
abilities, training, morale, organization, objectives, terrain, weather, luck, etc.) are not ade-
quately accounted for. Moreover, the nature of combat ensures that there is considerable
uncertainty in the data themselves.
3. BATTLE OF KURSK OVERVIEW
After suffering a terrible defeat at Stalingrad in the winter of 1943, the Germans desperately
wanted to regain the initiative. In the spring of 1943, the Eastern Front was dominated by a
Figure 1. Bracken’s (B) [2], Fricker’s (F) [8], Wiper, Pettit, and Young’s (W) [20], and Clemens’ (C)
[4] estimates of p and q. The parameters range from below 0 to over 5. Bracken, Fricker, and Wiper et al.
were studying the battle of the Ardennes. Clemens’ fits are on the Battle of Kursk.
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salient, 200 km wide and 150 km deep, centered on the city of Kursk. The Germans planned,
in a classic pincer operation named Operation Citadel, to eliminate the salient and destroy the
Soviet forces in it. On 2 July 1943, Hitler declared, “This attack is of decisive importance. It
must succeed, and it must do so rapidly and convincingly. It must secure for us the initia-
tive. . . . The victory of Kursk must be a blazing torch to the world.” [18]
After nearly 2 months of delays, Operation Citadel was launched on 5 July, with a two-front
attack on the Kursk salient. Due to good intelligence and the extra time that the Soviets had to
get ready, the Germans attacked well-prepared positions. The attack on the northern front ran
into stiff Soviet defenses and quickly bogged down. However, on the southern front of the battle,
in heavy fighting, the Germans penetrated as much as 46 km by 12 July. This put the Germans
in position to capture the town of Prokhorovka and establish a bridgehead over the Psel River,
the last natural barrier between them and Kursk. To counter this, the Soviets deployed their
strategic armored reserve, the 5th Guards Tank Army, under Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmis-
trov. On the 12th, outside of Prokhorovka, the German’s II SS Panzer Corps, commanded by SS
Obergruppenfuehrer Paul Hausser, slammed into the advancing 5th Guards Tank Army. The
result has been called the greatest armored engagement in history. On that day, the Germans lost
98 tanks,1 while the Soviets lost 414 tanks. Although, in terms of casualties, Germany seemed
to win the day, Hitler gave orders on 13 July to cancel Operation Citadel. For the rest of the
battle, the Germans assumed a generally defensive posture. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein,
Commander of Army Group South, felt that “[stopping the offensive] at this moment [was]
tantamount to throwing victory away [10].” By 23 July, Soviet counterattacks had regained all
of the ground lost in the battle. As Manstein prophetically wrote “the last German offensive in
the East ended in a fiasco, even though the enemy . . . suffered four times their losses” (see [10]).
More information about the battle of Kursk can be found in [3], [10], [18], and [22].
4. DATA AND ANALYSIS APPROACH
4.1 The Data
The data in [3], provided by CAA, detail Army Group South’s attack on the southern side of
the salient. The data cover 2 weeks of fighting involving over 300,000 German and 500,000
Soviet combat soldiers, including all line and headquarter units. Support personnel are not in the
database. While the database contains information on 15 days of fighting (4–18 July), we only
use the last 14 days because the battle did not begin in earnest until 5 July. Table 1 shows the
German’s and Soviet’s daily combat manpower (line and headquarter units) and casualties.
Following Bracken [2], Fricker [8], Clemens [4], and Wiper et al. [20], we aggregate the
numerous systems on each side into four broad categories: manpower, tanks, armored personnel
carriers (APC), and artillery. See Turkes [19] for a specific mapping of systems to categories in
this study. This is not an easy task and probably accounts for some of the differences between
the studies.
Table 2 displays the German daily on hand and losses for the four categories during the battle.
Daily losses included items destroyed, abandoned, and damaged; some of the damaged items
were repaired and returned to battle. Table 3 gives the same data for the Soviets.
1 It is interesting to note that many sources (e.g., [18]) estimate higher German losses. However, those
estimates are based more on second-hand battlefield reports and myths about the battle, rather than a
careful examination of unit’s logs. The developers of the data, The Depuy Institute, speculate that higher
German casualties at Prokhorovka may have served the interests of both Soviet and German propaganda.
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The data in Tables 1–3 classify the many combat systems in the battle into four broad
categories (manpower, tanks, APCs, and artillery). Even so, with only 14 days of data, there are
not enough degrees of freedom to fit heterogeneous Lanchester models—though Clemens [4],
with additional assumptions (constraints), investigated aspects of heterogeneous models. Thus,
like the authors above, we fit homogeneous models. Table 4 presents the data on the combat
power of the Soviet and German forces. The combat power of a force is defined as a weighted
sum of combat manpower, APCs, tanks, and artillery, with weights of 1, 5, 20, and 40,
respectively. These are the weights used in the previous studies. Bracken [2] writes that:
“Virtually all theater-level dynamic combat simulation models incorporate similar weights,










5 July 507698 8527 301341 6192
6 July 498884 9423 297205 4302
7 July 489175 10431 293960 3414
8 July 481947 9547 306659 2942
9 July 470762 11836 303879 2953
10 July 460808 10770 302014 2040
11 July 453126 7754 300050 2475
12 July 433813 19422 298710 2612
13 July 423351 10522 299369 2051
14 July 415254 8723 297395 2140
15 July 419374 4076 296237 1322
16 July 416666 2940 296426 1350
17 July 415461 1217 296350 949
18 July 413298 3260 295750 1054
a Casualties are those killed, wounded, captured/missing in action, and disease and
nonbattle injuries. Daily force levels depend on previous force levels, casualties, and
reinforcements. The attacking Germans are outnumbered.














5 July 986 198 1142 29 1166 24
6 July 749 248 1128 14 1161 5
7 July 673 121 1101 27 1154 7
8 July 596 108 1085 16 1213 13
9 July 490 139 1073 14 1210 6
10 July 548 36 1114 42 1199 12
11 July 563 63 1104 16 1206 15
12 July 500 98 1099 12 1194 12
13 July 495 57 1096 4 1187 7
14 July 480 46 1093 6 1184 5
15 July 426 79 1089 5 1183 3
16 July 495 23 1092 1 1179 4
17 July 557 7 1095 1 1182 2
18 July 588 6 1098 5 1182 11
a The Germans suffered their heaviest tank losses during the first 2 days of the battle, when they were
attacking heavily prepared defenses.
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either as inputs or as decision parameters computed as the simulations progress.” In a sensitivity
analysis, Turkes [19] found that, for the battle of Kursk, the broad conclusions are robust to the
chosen weights.
In generalized Lanchester models, the attrition (combat power losses) to each side is a
function of the size of the forces, as measured in combat power. Figure 2 displays simultaneous
pairwise scatter plots on German combat power (GCP), German combat power losses (GCPL),
Soviet combat power (SCP), and Soviet combat power losses (SCPL). Each plot in the figure
consists of a scatter plot between two of the four variables, which are identified by the labels in
the corresponding diagonal elements. The points in the plots are labeled according to the 14 days
of the battle.
We can glean several things from Figure 2. First and foremost is that all of the variables
appear to be (generally) positively correlated—with the exceptions often being caused by the
outlying data point corresponding to Soviet losses on day 8. The ordering of the numbers in the














5 July 2396 105 507 4 705 13
6 July 2367 117 501 6 676 30
7 July 2064 259 490 11 661 15
8 July 1754 315 477 13 648 14
9 July 1495 289 458 19 640 9
10 July 1406 157 463 3 629 13
11 July 1351 135 462 4 628 7
12 July 977 414 432 30 613 16
13 July 978 117 424 8 606 10
14 July 907 118 418 8 603 5
15 July 883 96 417 1 601 5
16 July 985 27 417 0 600 3
17 July 978 42 417 2 602 0
18 July 948 85 409 8 591 4
a On 12 July, the day of the “blood bath at Prokhorovka,” the Soviets lost 414 tanks.










5 July 586353 11167 373411 11257
6 July 575769 12993 364265 9532
7 July 559345 16266 359085 6249
8 July 545332 16472 372524 5702
9 July 528552 18071 367444 6043
10 July 516403 14445 366504 3450
11 July 507576 10754 365070 4415
12 July 480033 28492 361965 5112
13 July 469271 13302 362229 3491
14 July 459604 11323 359820 3290
15 July 463159 6201 357522 3047
16 July 462451 3600 358946 1975
17 July 461186 2067 360245 1174
18 July 457943 5160 360280 1639
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plots reveals that the combat forces on both sides, but particularly the Soviets, were steadily
declining during the battle. Casualties were also generally decreasing in time, particularly for the
Germans. It is important to emphasize that correlations among the variables, and their corre-
lations with time, complicate the analysis by confounding relationships. For example, is the
primary cause of the decreasing German casualties the decreasing Soviet force level, the
decreasing German force level, a combination of both, or something else that is correlated with
time? Also, there is not much variation in GCP; thus, it may be difficult to see the effects that
occur as GCP changes. Finally, a few points stand out from the others—in particular, the Soviet
losses on day 8 and, to a lesser extent, the German losses during the first 2 days.
4.2. Analysis Approach
Given the aggregated values in Table 4, we investigate what values of the parameters (a, b,
p, q, and d) best fit the data. Of course, our focus is on p and q, for they relate to the Lanchester
laws of attrition. In particular, we are interested in whether the square, linear, or logarithmic
laws fit well. The other parameters (a, b, and d) undoubtedly will vary in different battles,
depending on the forces fighting, the intensity of the battle, the terrain, and many other factors.
Our measure of fit, taken from [2], is the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) between the
Figure 2. Pairwise scatter plots of German combat power (GCP), German combat power losses (GCPL),
Soviet combat power (SCP), and Soviet combat power losses (SCPL), with the points corresponding to the
14 days of data.
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estimated and actual attrition. The objective is to find the parameters that minimize SSR—i.e.,




B˙ n  ad*nRnpBnq2  
n1
14
R˙ n  bd*nBnpRnq2, (3)
where
n indexes the 14 days of the battle,
d*n  d if the side (Red or Blue) is on the defensive on day n and 1/d if the side is
on the offensive. If neither or both sides are clearly on the offensive, then d*n  1.
Rather than use a standard optimization method to find the parameters that minimize SSR,
such as Bracken’s [2] constrained grid search, Fricker’s [8] linear regression on logarithmically
transformed data, Wiper et al.’s [20] posterior maximum, or Clemens’ [4] numerical Newton-
Raphson, we look at the best-fitting response surface as a function of p and q. Given p and q,
it turns out to be relatively easy to find a, b, and d to minimize SSR. Our approach is as follows:
For a fixed d, solve for a and b by regression through the origin (a simple analytic formula
exists; see [12] or [13]). Note: Bn, Rn, B˙ n, and R˙ n are known—thus, only a and b need to be
estimated. This calculation is repeated for many values of d. Specifically, through a one-
dimensional line search on d, we find the d, and associated a and b, that minimize SSR for the
given p and q. By plotting the contours of the minimum SSR as a function of p and q, not only
can we visually assess where the optimum occurs, but we also get a better understanding of how
the surface of Lanchester exponent parameters fits the battle.
5. LANCHESTER AND THE BATTLE OF KURSK
This section investigates how the various parameters fit the Kursk data, initially with d  1.
Figure 3 displays the contours of the minimum SSR as function of p and q. We find that the
surface is relatively flat around the optimum. In fact, the contour with SSR  6.0  108, about
10% above the minimum SSR, contains p values ranging from below 2 to over 10 (off the chart),
and q values ranging from below 0 to near 3.
Using a grid search (at four decimals of precision) in the region of the visually obtained
optimum, the best fit is obtained at p  5.6957 and q  1.2702, with an SSR of 5.46546 
108.2 Note: The precision is needed because small changes in large exponent parameters, as one
gets when rounding, dramatically affects the fits. The best-fitting p ( p  5.6957) is so large
as to be highly implausible. It suggests that a doubling of the attacker’s force increases the
instantaneous kill rate by greater than 50 times. One must, of course, be wary of extrapolating
beyond the range of the data. Nonetheless, most analysts use values of p and q that are within
the interval from zero to one—typically zero or one. The best fit is also far from all of the basic
Lanchester laws. The a and b corresponding to the optimal fit are 1.466  1035 and 1.201 
1036. This suggests that, individually, the Germans were more effective than the Soviets. The
2 If we assume that the Germans lost 300 tanks on day 8, as some books suggest, we get almost identical
results, with the best fit obtained at p  5.01 and q  1.35.
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optimal values of a and b are quite small, as they must be to balance the very high values of the
optimal exponent parameters p and q.
In addition to SSR, another measure of fit that we use is R2, where R2  1  SSR/SST. SST,




B˙ n  B 2  
n1
14
R˙ n  R 2, (4)
with B and R denoting the mean daily force losses for the Soviets and Germans, respectively.
Here, R2 is defined analogously to how it is in standard least squares regression and is a linear
function of SSR. Larger R2 values correspond to better fits, with a perfect fit (i.e., an SSR  0)
yielding an R2  1. Note: In this setup, it is possible to get negative R2 values, which means
that the fitted model yields worse results than using the average daily losses as estimates. An
advantage of R2 over SSR is that it is invariant to linear transforms of the data. This allows us
to compare models using different weights and data. In the best-fitting model above, the R2 is
.237. That is, the model explains less than a quarter of the squared variation.
We can see how well the optimum parameter estimates fit the battle by examining the actual
and estimated losses over the 14 days. Figures 4 and 5 show the actual and estimated Soviet and
Figure 3. A contour plot of the minimum SSR as a function of p and q, with the tactical parameter (d)
not included (i.e., no attacker or defender advantage in this model). Note: The small wiggles and other
nonsmooth features in this and the other contour plots are a function of the granularity of the points upon
which the surface was evaluated and the software used to generate the plots. In all subregions that the
authors have zoomed in on, the contours are smooth.
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German losses using the best-fitting generalized Lanchester model. The estimated German
losses track the real losses quite well, while the Soviet’s do not. In fact, the R2 calculated using
only the German forces is .870. The R2 for only the Soviet forces is .124—only marginally
better than using the mean daily loss as the estimate. The Soviet’s fit is highly affected by the
outlying point on day 8. Also, we see that, for both sides, the model overestimates the casualties
for the last few days of the battle, suggesting that the battle had lost some of its intensity. This
brings into question the assumption of constant attrition parameters.
Figure 4. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the Soviet forces using the best-fitting Lanchester
model (with d  1). There is one outlying data point (corresponding to 12 July). Also, the estimated losses
are noticeably high for the last 4 days.
Figure 5. Fitted losses plotted versus real losses for the German forces using the best-fitting Lanchester
model (with d  1). The fit to the Germans is much better than that of the Soviets.
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Let us now consider the tactical parameter d, which turns out to be a complex issue. From [3],
we see that on most days, over the entire southern front, some units of both the Soviets and the
Germans are attacking and defending. However, in general, the Germans were the attackers
during the first 7 days of the data. On the 8th day, for the first time, more Soviet than German
units were attacking. After the 8th day, the proportion of German units attacking is significantly
lower, while the proportion of Soviet units attacking is generally higher. Consequently, we
define the Germans as the attackers the first 7 days and the Soviets the last 7 days. With the
tactical parameter d so defined, the best-fitting model is p  5.8703, q  1.0078, d  1.028,
a  4.907  1035, and b  3.521  1036. The new SSR is 5.46202  108, a negligible
improvement over the no tactical parameter fit. The new R2 is .238. The Germans are still more
lethal per unit of force (a  b), and there is a slight attacker advantage (d  1). The contour
plot of the minimum SSR (see Fig. 6) as a function of p and q, (now optimized over a, b, and
d), is similar in shape to Figure 3, though slightly flatter, as the d parameter allows more
flexibility in the fit.
6. LANCHESTER AND THE BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES
In this section, we apply the same approach to the data on the Ardennes campaign (i.e.,
mapping the surface contour as a function of p and q). See [2], [5], [8], and the references
therein, for overviews of the battle of the Ardennes. Specifically, we look at contour plots for
both Bracken’s [2] and Fricker’s [8] data sets on the Ardennes campaign. Figures 7 and 8
display the minimum SSR as a function of p and q for Bracken’s [2] and Fricker’s [8] data,
respectively. In both figures, the tactical parameter d is used in the fit. As before, for each p and
q, the minimum SSR (optimized over a, b, d) is displayed.
Figure 6. A contour plot of the minimum SSR as a function of p and q with (d) included.
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The best-fitting p and q found while calculating Figure 7 are p  .91 and q  .61, with
an SSR of 1.36  107 and an R2 of .381. The tactical parameter at the empirically determined
best fit is 1.12, implying an attacker advantage. Moreover, we see from the graph that the surface
is relatively flat around the optimum, and contrary to what Bracken found with his grid search,
the square law fits the best of the major Lanchester laws (i.e., square, linear, and logarithmic).
The flatness of the surfaces also suggests that in Bayesian analyses posterior inferences will be
strongly influenced by precise priors, as Wiper et al. [20] found.
The best-fitting p and q found while calculating Figure 8 are p  .6 and q  5.2, with
a SSR of 2.8  107 and an R2 of .50. These p and q seem questionable, with a side’s casualties
increasing exponentially (at a power of 5.2) as a function of its force level, and inversely to its
opponent’s force level. The tactical parameter d, at the empirically determined best fit, is 1.25,
again implying an attacker advantage.
The last two figures, based on different approaches to formatting the data, tell very different
stories. Which surface should we believe? There are arguments for both approaches. Fricker [8]
fit his model to more days; however, over the 10 days Bracken [2] used, we are more likely to
get a relatively homogeneous battle. Furthermore, Bracken’s model of 10 1-day battles may be
easier to interpret than Fricker’s formulation, which considers the fighting one big battle, with
all of the forces that were involved in the battle calculated in the equations as if they participated
from the beginning. Substantial forces, particularly on the Allied side, such as Patton’s Third
Army, did not participate until several days after the start of the campaign (see [21]). The key
point, however, is not which formulation is better, as there are good arguments both ways, but
to notice that the surfaces look qualitatively different, depending on how the data are formatted.
Figure 7. A contour plot of the minimum SSR as a function of p and q, with the tactical parameter d,
using Bracken’s [2] Ardennes combat forces data.
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Thus, the conclusions can be very sensitive to these factors. Furthermore, in neither case is the
optimum near one of the basic Lanchester laws.
7. EXCURSIONS
In the previous sections we looked at how the generalized Lanchester exponent parameters ( p
and q) fit the battles of Kursk and Ardennes. In this section, we look more closely at the basic
Lanchester models, some of the key assumptions, and variability in the fits.
7.1. Fitting Lanchester Equations for the Battle of Kursk Using Combat Manpower
In our fits above, when computing the combat power of a force, we use the previous authors’
subjective weights. The question is: Do the weights chosen qualitatively affect what we found?
Figure 9 shows the minimum SSR surface, as a function of p and q, with the tactical parameter
d, using only combat manpower. That is, the weights for artillery, APCs, and tanks are all set
at zero. When comparing Figure 9 with Figure 6, we see that they are qualitatively similar. Both
surfaces have smooth, relatively flat, elliptical contours, with the minimum occurring far from
the basic Lanchester laws. Again, the best-fitting p and q values are highly implausible, with the
optimal p exponents much greater than the optimal q exponents. The optimum p and q values
for the combat manpower data are p  7.8 and q  3.4, with an R2 of .234. In [19], a variety
of other weights are examined (e.g., tanks worth more than artillery, etc.) with the bottom-line
Figure 8. The minimum SSR as a function of p and q, with the tactical parameter d, using Fricker’s [8]
formulation of the Ardennes combat forces data.
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conclusions remaining the same. Furthermore, adding air-sorties to the calculations does not
substantially affect the fits (again see [19]).
7.2. Fitting the Basic Lanchester Models
We have seen that the best-fitting generalized Lanchester models are far from the basic
Lanchester laws (i.e., square, linear, and logarithmic). Several questions remain: How do these
laws compare to one another? How do they compare to the best-fitting models? Does one of the
Table 5. Lanchester law fits for the battle of Kursk, with the tactical parameter d, for both
Bracken’s [2] weights and combat manpower.a
Lanchester law Weights p q d R2
Square Bracken’s 1 0 1.09 .081
Linear Bracken’s 1 1 1.02 .131
Logarithmic Bracken’s 0 1 1.02 .085
Optimum fit Bracken’s 5.87 1.01 1.03 .238
Square Manpower 1 0 1.11 .074
Linear Manpower 1 1 1.04 .116
Logarithmic Manpower 0 1 1.04 .086
Optimum fit Manpower 7.74 3.41 .86 .234
a In both cases, the linear law is the best fitting of the basic laws; however, the linear law is not
close to the optimal fit.
Figure 9. The minimum SSR as a function of p and q for Kursk, with the tactical parameter d, based only
on combat manpower.
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basic laws consistently fit better across the breadth of models examined? This subsection
examines these questions. Here, we consider only models with the tactical parameter d. Similar
results hold for models without d.
Table 5 shows how the basic Lanchester models (i.e., the square, linear, and logarithmic laws)
fit the battle of Kursk using Bracken’s [2] weights (i.e., 1, 5, 20, and 40) and the manpower data.
We see that, for both sets of weights, the linear law fits best among the basic laws, but it is
significantly inferior to the optimum fit, with an R2 of .131, compared to .238. While the linear
law fits better than the square and logarithmic laws, its fit is not substantially better. Thus, this
suggests that with the right coefficients, any of the basic laws give about the same result. It is
also interesting to note that we get similar results using either weighting scheme, with Bracken’s
weights generally fitting slightly better.
Table 6 displays similar information from the Ardennes campaign, using Bracken’s 10 days
of data [2]. There are several interesting features in the table. First, much better fits are achieved
with Bracken’s weights than with combat manpower. Furthermore, while the best-fitting basic
Lanchester law is the square law, with Bracken’s weights, all of the basic laws fit the data about
as well. The R2 (.367) for the square law is only 3.6% below the optimum fit’s R2 (.381). It is
interesting to note that Bracken concluded that the best-fitting model was the linear law. Why
the discrepancy? Because Bracken used a grid search, which, as he noted in [2], by necessity,
will not consider all of the parameter combinations for the various Lanchester laws. When
comparing Tables 5 and 6, we see that the Ardennes data fit all of the models significantly better
than the Kursk data when using Bracken’s weights. However, much of the difference is due to
the Soviet losses on 12 July, which is an outlier. Moreover, none of the basic laws stand out as
the best fitting.
7.3. Breaking the Battle of Kursk into Several Phases
An important assumption we (and the previous researchers) made when fitting the models is
that the attrition parameters (a and b) remain constant throughout the campaign. Surely, over
the course of the battle, the attrition rates waxed and waned to some extent. Ideally, we would
estimate new coefficients for each day of the fighting, as the data are available daily. Unfortu-
nately, if we do so, the system is overdetermined. That is, on each day, for any p and q, there
exist a and b such that the fitted casualties equal the real data.
To overcome this limitation, we break the battle into several phases, each of which is believed
relatively homogeneous. While several different partitions of the data were examined (see [19]),
Table 6. Lanchester law fits for the battle of the Ardennes using Bracken’s [2] combat
manpower model and the tactical parameter d.a
Lanchester law Weights p q d R2
Square Bracken’s 1 0 1.14 .367
Linear Bracken’s 1 1 1.17 .291
Logarithmic Bracken’s 0 1 1.23 .330
Optimum fit Bracken’s .91 .61 1.12 .381
Square Manpower 1 0 1.04 .079
Linear Manpower 1 1 1.06 .226
Logarithmic Manpower 0 1 1.10 .025
Optimum fit Manpower .15 .90 1.05 .280
a Bracken’s weights provide much better fits than the manpower data. Also, the square law is
the best-fitting basic Lanchester law.
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we focus here on what seems to be the most natural one based on the Kursk data and other
historical accounts. In our first phase—the first 2 days of the campaign—the Germans generally
attack prepared defenses. Our second phase contains days 3–7, which, by and large, had the
Germans attacking hasty defenses. The 8th day of fighting, “the bloodbath at Prokorovka,” is
unique and is considered a phase by itself. Of course, since this phase is only a single day, there
is a perfect fit (i.e., no residual error); thus, this removes the (outlying) eighth day from the fits.
The fourth and last phase is days 9–14, in which the Soviets were more on the offensive, and
the battle intensity was fading, as can be seen in Figures 2, 4, and 5.
Table 7. Lanchester law fits for the battle of Kursk, using Bracken’s [2] weights,
when the attrition coefficients are estimated in four separate phases.a
Lanchester law p q R2
Square 1 0 .804
Linear 1 1 .816
Logarithmic 0 1 .812
Optimum fit 3.92 3.38 .832
Four phase means fit Not applicable Not applicable .800
a Almost all of the improvements in R2 are due to the differences in means between
the four phases.
Figure 10. The SSR surface when the attrition coefficients are fit separately for four different phases
(days 1–2, 3–7, 8, and 9–14). Due to the additional parameters, the fits are much better; however, the shape
of the contour plot is similar to Figure 3. Here, too, the minimum occurs at implausibly large exponent
parameters p and q.
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Fitting the model over multiple phases must result in a better overall fit because there are
additional parameters (degrees of freedom) to explain the variation in casualties. In our earlier
fits there were five parameters ( p, q, a, b, and d). The new fits have 10 parameters: the
exponent parameters p and q, and different attrition coefficients, a and b, in each of the four
phases. The defensive parameter d cannot be used here, because in each of the phases one side
is on the offensive throughout. Thus, within any phase, the effect of being on the defensive, as
measured by d, is confounded with the phase’s attrition parameters.
The optimization routine, as before, searches for the p and q that minimize the sum of the
squared residuals between the fitted and actual casualties. For all p and q that are evaluated, in
each phase, the best-fitting a and b are determined by regression through the origin using the
data for that phase. This results in eight attrition coefficient parameters being calculated for
every p and q examined. For each p and q, the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) is calculated
by summing over the entire campaign (14 days) the squared difference between the fitted and
actual casualties. Figure 10 displays the SSR surface as a function of p and q. This surface is
strikingly similar in shape to the surface in Figure 3, generated by the constant attrition
coefficient model, in that the contours are elliptic in shape, with the axes almost aligned to the
ordinate and the abscissa. In both figures, the ellipses are wider than they are tall, and the
minimums are in the first quadrant at implausibly large exponent parameters. Some important
differences are: (1) the SSR surface for the four-phase model is much lower, i.e., a significantly
better fit; and (2) the four-phase model surface is significantly flatter, implying that a wider
range of generalized Lanchester models are “near optimal.”
Table 7 displays the optimum and basic Lanchester model fits for the four-phase model. The
optimum Lanchester exponent parameters for the four-phase model are p  3.92 and q  3.38,
with an R2 of .832. This is a much better fit than any of the single-phase models we looked at.
However, most of the improvement comes from partitioning the battle into the four phases. The
R2 that is obtained by using the mean loss in each phase, for each side, as the sides’ estimated
losses, is .800. Consequently, the optimum four-phase Lanchester model, with 10 free param-
eters, has an R2 of only .032 above the R2 obtained by using the four phase means. Thus,
accounting for the varying intensity, terrains, postures, etc. explains significantly more of the
variation in losses than the Lanchester models do. This is consistent with what Hartley and
Hembold found in their study of the Inchon–Seoul battle [9]. Also, we can see from Table 7 that
the basic Lanchester models fit only marginally better than the phase means, with the linear law
fitting slightly better than the square and logarithmic laws.
7.4. Assessing Differences in Fits
In the discussions above on the differences between various fits, as measured by R2, we
loosely refer to some differences as significant and others as insignificant. In this section we use
the bootstrap (see Efron and Tibshirani [6]) to formally assess the differences in R2 between
Lanchester models. We focus on identifying differences that are of sufficient size that the
ordering of the estimates (different R2 values) is unlikely to be effected by the natural variation
in the data. Keeping in mind that all battles are nonrepeatable events, we define the natural
variation as the variation that would occur (due to the inherent randomness of combat) if many
essentially identical forces fought similar 14-day battles and the inevitable errors associated with
recording and collecting decades old combat data.
In fitting the Lanchester models above, the 14 days of the battle are essentially treated as 14
minibattles. That is, for a given law (i.e., specific p and q), we find the values of a, b, and d
which minimize R2 (or equivalently SSR) over the 14 days. Here, we quantify the variability in
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R2, for each law, nonparametrically, by resampling the empirical daily attrition coefficients,
from the 14 days, as follows. For each of the three basic Lanchester laws and the Lanchester
optimum fit, using the law’s optimum d value, we calculate aˆi and bˆ i for i  1, 2, . . . , 14,
where aˆi and bˆ i are the daily attrition parameters that achieve equality in Eqs. (1) and (2). That
is, the 14 (aˆi, bˆ i) pairs are the attrition rates that actually occurred in the battle (according to the
data set) if the Lanchester law being used (to generate the resampled battles) held exactly. A
“bootstrap battle” is created by sampling with replacement from the 14 (aˆi, bˆ i) pairs and
generating 14 daily “bootstrap casualties” by multiplying the 14 (aˆi, bˆ i) pairs with the actual
force levels and the law’s optimum d (or 1/d, as appropriate). Thus, all of the bootstrap battles
have the same daily force levels, attacker, and defender as in the real battle. The bootstrap battles
are different from the real battle in that the daily casualties are generated as just specified.
Using the above procedure for the three basic Lanchester laws and the optimum Lanchester
fit, 1000 bootstrap battles (from the 1414 possible ones) are independently generated (sampled).
In each of the 1000 bootstrap battles we find the best-fitting model (maximum R2) over a, b,
and d, as before. This gives us a sample of 1000 bootstrap R2 values, which we label Ri2, for
i  1, 2, . . . , 1,000. For each law, the Ri2 values are sorted from smallest to largest. The
interval from the 50th largest Ri2 to the 950th largest Ri2 constitutes a 90% bootstrap percentile
interval (see [6]). Table 8 shows the bootstrap percentile intervals for the battle of Kursk. From
the table, we see that the differences in R2 estimates from the real data are small relative to the
variability in them. This is especially true for the basic laws. In particular, there is substantial
overlap in the percentile intervals.
The variability associated with the R2 estimates makes it seem as though the Kursk data do
not support one model over the others. However, there are substantial positive correlations
between the bootstrap R2 values for the different Lanchester models. That is, bootstrap battles
that fit well to one law usually do likewise to the other laws. In our resampling, we use the same
resampled days for all four of the Lanchester laws that are compared. Thus, we can count how
often one law fits better than another. Table 9 displays this information for all six pairs of laws.
Only the optimum fit consistently fits better than the other laws. Thus, we conclude that the
Table 8. Bootstrap estimate of the standard error and 90% bootstrap percentile intervals in







Square .081 .054 .064 (.012, .185)
Linear .131 .087 .102 (.059, .265)
Logarithmic .085 .065 .087 (.045, .234)
Optimum fit .238 .254 .158 (.020, .533)
Table 9. Proportion of bootstrap battles (out of 1000) in which the
Lanchester Law specified by the row fit better (i.e., higher Ri2) than the
Lanchester law specified by the column for the battle of Kursk.
Lanchester Law Square Linear Logarithmic
Linear .636 — —
Logarithmic .584 .291 —
Optimum fit .970 .980 .968
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natural variation in the data is such that for any given realization all of the basic Lanchester laws
had a reasonable chance (greater than a quarter of the time) of being a better fit than any other
basic law.
Table 10 is similar to Table 9, only it uses the first 10 days of Bracken’s Ardennes data. Here,
for any given bootstrap realization, all of the laws have a nontrivial empirical probability (.25)
of having a greater bootstrap R2 than any other (including the optimal) law. Thus, here we
conclude that the observed ordering of the laws can easily be explained simply by the variation
inherent in the data.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Generalized Lanchester models and their extensions are used to model highly aggregated
attrition in many important analyses despite little empirical validation. The recent work by CAA
in developing the detailed two-sided, time-phased Ardennes and Kursk databases offers new
hope to those trying to validate Lanchester’s models and determine which variant best applies
to real aggregated combat. Our efforts focused on answering the following questions: (1) Why
had the previous studies on the Ardennes data given such discordant best-fitting models? (2) Can
our new method and the Kursk data add something to the long running debate about which
Lanchester law is “best?”
By recognizing that, given p, q, and d, the optimum a and b can be found by regression
through the origin, our approach reduces the dimensions that need to be searched from five to
three. Furthermore, this approach allows us to easily find the contours of the sum of the squared
residuals’ surface as a function of p and q. Consequently, we are able to visually identify where
the optimum occurs. Moreover, we get a better understanding of how the fit varies with the
parameter settings. An examination of SSR surfaces, in particular, their relative flatness, reveals
why Bracken [2], Clemens [4], Fricker [8], and Wiper, Pettit, and Young [20] obtained such
varied optimal parameter estimates.
As in previous studies, we were searching to see which of the basic Lanchester laws best fit
the data. We found that there is little difference in fits between the square, linear, and
logarithmic Lanchester laws—with those observed differences explainable simply by chance
variation! For analysts, this implies that it doesn’t matter which of the basic Lanchester laws you
use. With the right coefficients, you will get about the same result with whichever variant is
used. More importantly, we found that no constant attrition coefficient generalized Lanchester
model fit very well in either battle! Indeed, much more of the variation in casualties is explained
by the phases of the battle. Therefore, if there is an underlying Lanchester law, at least for highly
aggregated data, its effects appear to be dominated by other factors.
Lanchester’s intuitive and parsimonious equations have been, since their introduction the
better part of a century ago, the most common tool for modeling aggregate attrition. While we
Table 10. Proportion of bootstrap battles (out of 1000) in which the
Lanchester Law specified by the row fit better (i.e., higher Ri2) than the
Lanchester law specified by the column for the battle of the Ardennes
using Bracken’s data.
Lanchester law Square Linear Logarithmic
Linear .604 — —
Logarithmic .376 .268 —
Optimum fit .525 .446 .638
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are wary about making too much from two battles (though these are all we have of this type),
this research adds to the evidence that Lanchester equations may be too blunt of an instrument
for modeling the attrition of highly aggregated forces. Indeed, it is asking a lot to address most
of the complexities of combat attrition in a model with only a handful (four or five in this paper)
of parameters. The failure to find any good-fitting Lanchester model suggests that it may be
beneficial to look for new approaches to model highly aggregated attrition.
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